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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal fran an Order to Show Cause in a 
domestic action seeking, inter alia, an increase in child support 
payments from the defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN UJNER COURr 
After a hearing before the court, sitting without a jw:y, 
plaintiff was granted an increase in child support payments from $150. 00 
to $225.00 per rronth. It is from this portion of the Order which 
defendant appeals. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 
The court below erred: by rewarding plaintiff equitable 
relief, despite her unclean hands by abusing its discretion in deciding 
that a material change in circumstance had taken place which warranted 
an increase in child support, and by arbitrarily using a pre-detennined 
schedule to detennine the na-v arrnunt of child sup.::>rt, and, thereby, 
denying defendant his right to due process of law. 
RELIEF SOOGHT ON .A.PPEAL 
Defendant seeks an Order reversing the judgment of the court 
belON and/or granting judgment in his favor, which denies an increase in 
child support payments, or, that failing, a na-v hearing. 
STATEMENr OF FACTS 
History of the Case. Plaintiff/Respondent and Defendant/ 
Appellant were divorced in the court belON on May 26, 1972. Defendant 
was ordered to pay child supp::>rt payments in the arrount of $150.00 per 
rronth, and alim::my in the arrount of $50.00 per rronth. (Decree of 
Divorce) Appellant made his payments irregularly, at first, but had 
resolved the problem and paid regularly during recent years. (F&C-1, 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-2-
T6, 91, 121.) 
Resp:>ndent was reroarried on August 29, 1977. (T-4, 5, 25) 
Thereafter, resp:mdent deliberately concealed and hid the fact of her 
remarriage, and continued to accept alimony paymmts from appellant. 
(T-3, 5, 25, 38, 62, 121, F&C-1) During June, 1980, approximately 
thirty-five (35) nonths later, appellant discovered the remarriage. 
(T-3, 87) The parties exchanged letters with respect to the remarriage 
and respondent's continued acceptance of alimony payments during the 
said thirty-five rronth period. (Exhibit 14D, 16P) The parties were 
unable to agree upon a resolution to the problem, so appellant ceased 
rraking alinony payments and began deducting their equivalent from 
child support, believing himself to have "prepaid child support" • 
(T-6, 107) 
Cormencement. On or about November 5, 1980, respondent 
signed and ~re to an Affidavit in support of an Order to Sho.v Cause 
requesting rrodification of the Decree of Divorce, to-wit: an increase 
in child supp:>rt to $250.00 per rronth. On page 2 of the said Affidavit, 
paragraph 3, resp:>ndent acknowledged that she rray have been in default under 
the Decree of Divorce, but reasoned that she had "* * * assmn:?d the 
additional $50.00 was to cover the child's additional needs because of 
her handicap and because Plaintiff was paying the health and accident 
insurance of $22.00 per rconth,* * *11 (See plaintiff's Order to Show Cause 
in re: r-bd:ification, p. 2.) It should be noted that the trial court 
later found no handicap and no responsibility in appellant for the 
said insurance premiums. (T-121, F&C page 2) 
Discovery. The parties then responded to written Interrogatories 
which had been extended to each by the other. 
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a.) In her answers to appellant 1 s Interrogatories, respondent 
itemized her necessary IrOnthly expenses, vJhich totalled $970.00, with 
the rotation that "any amount remaining fran balance is used for clothin:r 
arrl entertainment". (Answer to Defendant's Interrogatories to Plaintiff, 
Page 3, No. 10) 
b.) Appellant itemized his necessary expenses at a total of 
$1,436.00 per rronth (Page 8, No. 17) and his net rronthly incane at 
$1,399.92 (Page 7-8, No. 15, Answers to Plaintiff's Interrogatories to 
Defen:iant) . 
Evidentiary Hearing. 'Ihe matter came on for hearing before 
the Hooorable John F. Wahlquist, District Court Judge, on October 22, 
1981. 
With respect to a change in cirCt.UnStance, the evidence adduced 
before the Court was base:l upon inflation. (T-16-17, 121-122) 
a.) Appellant's incan: had increased during the ten years 
fran approxirrately $8,000.00 per year to approx.i..'1lately $25,000.00 per 
year. (T-72) Appellant testified that his net rronthly incane at the 
time of the hearing was $1,540.00 per rronth, after taxes. · (T-92) The 
uncontradict.ed evidence with respect to his monthly necessary living 
expenses was that they total the $1,436.00 per rronth sworn to in the 
Answers to Interrogatories, plus additional expenses caused by inflation, 
leaving approximately $30.00 in excess for use for clothing, vacation, 
gi~s, entertainment or similar frills, each rronth. (T-95-97, 106) 
b.) Resp:m:ient' s inccrae had increased rrore dramatically during 
the same period. She had risen from au. S. Civil Service rating of 
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·Gs-4 to a rating of GSll, accounting for an annual inca:ne at the time 
of the hearing of $22, 500. 00, which gave her a net income at the time 
of the hearing of approx.L-nately $1,223.00 per rronth. (T-4, 62, 122) 
At the hearing, Respondent presented a new exhibit with respect to her 
expenses (Exhibit lP), which indicated and additional $410.00 in rconthly 
living expenses. On cross examination, respondent testified that the 
difference between the new schedule and her Interrogatory response 
is the difference "between necessary and actual" expenses, based up:>n 
her use of her rroney. (T-55-6, test.inony with respect to expenses 
T-8, 54-62) 
As an additional change of circumstance, respondent claimed 
that the parties' child had a learning disability. 'The parties 
testified with respect to the matter ( T-18, 42-4 7, 100) , but the Court 
found the mild to be nonnal. (T-122-123) 
Argurrents Presented by the Parties. Appellant' s counsel 
argued to the trial court that respondent 'Na.S not entitled to equitable 
relief for t..1-ie reason that she does not have clean hands. (TA-1) With 
respect to the child support issues, appellant argued that there 'Na.S no 
change in the cirCl.llllStance (TA-8), there was no need for an increase 
indicated (TA-6, 15) , and that even if there were appellant did not have 
the ability to pay an increased arrount (TA-6, 7, 15-16). 
Respondent argued to the court that the Unifonn Child Support 
Schedule of the Second Judicial District, adopted by policy statement 
and rule (a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A"), should be 
utilized to detennine the arrount to be paid, based solely upon the 
incane of appellant as applied to the schedule. (TA-9, 17, 19) The said 
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schedule pu!"fOrts to be one pranulgated pursuant to 45 CFR 302. 53, with 
respect to child support enforcenent by the Utah Department of Social 
Services, Office of Recovery Services. The expressed intention for the 
use of the schedule relates to ex pa.rte temporary supp::>rt orders, no 
hearings having yet been held. (See Exhibit) Respondent 1 s counsel, in 
urging its use, submitted that the schedule had been prepared by the 
trial judge, and that the judge had followed it and ought to folla,v 
it in the instant case. (TA-19) 
In response, appellant argued that the support issue should 
be based upon the rrother's need and the father's abilit.:j to pay, and 
not upon the schedule. (TA-14) 
Holding of Court Below. With respect to the matter being 
appealed from, the court below found that inflation was the chief change 
in circumstance with respect to the p::>sition of appellant, and that 
respcmdent has "done much 1:::>etter in life" and, further, that 11her 
incane should improve ver:y rapidly for the next five years if she * * * 
is able to hold her job at all * * *" (T-122) The court found that 
respondent had deliberately concealed her remarriage and that appellant 
would be entitled to an offset for the am.Junt overpaid. (T-121) Except 
to note his opinion that the parties "need to update the child support 
order after nine years", the court below gave no explanation, but raised 
the child support figure to $225.00 per rronth. (T-122, 123) 
Appeal. Appellant has appealed the decision of the court, 
urging that the decision of the court belON could only have been made 
arbitrarily on the basis of the pre-detennined schedule. The abuse of 
discretion resulted in an inequitable and unfair order, in that it 
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ignored the facts adduced which indicated that no rraterial change in 
circumstance had taken place wrarranting an increase, and, furt.~er, that 
appellant was unable to pay an increased anount, despite the express 
assumptions made in the schedule. Further, appellant urges that the 
said arbitrary use of the schedule violated his right to due process of 
law. Finally, appellant urges that the plaintiff came to the court 
belOW' in equity, without clean hands, and was not entitled to equitable 
relief. 
T =Reporter's Transcript of Testim::>ny and Ruling 
TA= Reporter's Transcript of Arguments 
F&C indicates Findings of Fact and Conclusions of I.aw 
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4th Revision Feb. 25, 1981 K? 
UN.IFORM CHILD SUPPORT SCHEDULE 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
AMOUNT TO BE PAID - GIVEN THE TOTAL NO. OF CHILDRff 
1 2 3 4 5 
47 70 87 116 145 
56 84 102 116 145 
. 67 100 120 132 I 145 
76 114 138 156 165 
85 128 153 172. 180 96 142 171 192 205 
105 160 189 212 230 
115 174 207 228 245 
125 ·1as 225 248 270 
135 202 243 272 285 
144 218 261 292 310 
154 232 276 308 330 
164 246· 294 328 350 
173 260 312 348 375 
184 276 330 364 390 
193 290 348 388 415 
202 304 366 408 435 
213 318 387 424 455 
222 334 399 444 475 
232 348 417 464 495 
242 352 435 484 520 
252 376 453 504 540 
261 394 471 524 560 
271 408 489 544 580 
281 422 504 560 605 
290 436 522 580 620 
301 452 540 600 645 
310 466 558 5Z4 665 
319 480 576 640 685 
330 494 594 660 710 
rhis table •,;as designed according to criteria set forth in 45 CFR 302.53, and 1Has computed 
using Section B of Form 849-P (revised Feb. 1981,) Utah Department of Social Services, 
Office of Recovery Services, Basic Child Support Enforca~ent. 
The amounts listed are intended to be used as the total temporary support order, given the 
collective number of children cared for by the custoaia1 parent and the non-custodial 
parent's gross monthly income {i.e., if the non-custodial parent's gross monthly income is 
bet"Neen S1009 and S1098, and there are three children, the suggested 11 target 11 for a temp-
orary support order ·ii1ou1d be S207 .OOo 
rhe schedule is based upon the non-custodial parent's monthly gross income. It automati-
cally assumes deductions (federal, state, FICA, retirement) and necessities such as housi~· 
utilities, and transportation. It also assumes the earning potential of the absent parsnt 
the abi 1 i ty to borrow, needs of the child and the amount of assistance which 'NOU1 d be pa ic 
to the chi1d under the full standard of need of the State's !'I-A plan. The fonnu1a is a1s ~esi~ned to insure, as a minimum, that the child for whom support is sought benefits from ~e 1nc:me and resources of the absent oarent on an equitable basis in comoarison ~ith an~ 
' - .. ~.. - ; ... "' "" • ~ .; .. • ... ~ n .. .: .. ;... ~ ~ :.- -:: ~,.. - ~ ! ,.. ~ ~ 4: • ~ ~ ~ c : ~ ,.. -: ~ r c ~ .,, i ": ~ ..! ~ c .= ~ 3 c 2 . 5 3 . .. Sponsored by the S J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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EX?U\NAT!ON OF TABLE 
This schedule is based upon the non-custodial parent's monthly gross 
income. It automatically assumes deductions and necessities, normal taxes, 
transportation, employment and living expenses, etc. 
rt 'Has designed according to criteria set forth in 45 CFR 302. 53, and 
was computed using Section B, of Form 849-P (revised Feb. 1981), Utah 
Department of Social Services, Office of Recovery Services, Basic Child 
Support Enforca~ent 
The amounts listed are intended to be used as the total e.x·parte 
temporary support order, given the collective number of children of the 
non-custodial parent who are cared for by the custodial parent, (i.e., if 
the non-custod i a 1 parent 1 s gross month 1 y income is· between $1025 and 
S1075, and there are a total of three children in the care of the custodial 
parent, the non-custodial parent could expect a temporary support order in. 
the amount of S207.00. 
NOTE: The figures in this table are intended to give the parties a 
"target," and to assist the parties in arriving at what has been determined 
as reasonable and conscionable based upon mean family income, standard 
deductions, welfare grants, etc. The non-custodial party wi11 be granted 
a hearing for a change frem this table, if such a _h~ar.i,i_g is. reg.u_es'!:ed.! !he 
~-~e of the table ls. not .. i11te.nded tc forectos.e tb.a Caurt. from. beari.a.g. i.ss.ues 
involvin_g_ who should be the custodial parent. Use of the table will be 
interpreted to oe a waiver of a right to a temporary hearing, unless 
requested by the adverse parent. 
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tN '!'HE OISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
?OL!CY STATEMENT 
~any parties at the bf!9inn1n9 of a divorce. petition the Court to 
detaMTrine a t~orary child su~port figuM!. and fr~uently this is the 
only real issue between them. 3e<:ause there is no general policy 
statement. the parties ai-9 handicapped in n99ot1ating tenoorary agr~e­
ments. Occasiona11y, the costs in attorney fees. lost wages, and other 
expenses of the hearing, exca~ the r~al difference bee~een the parties 
on their pn:ipos~ temcorary child support figures. 
me Court therefor"'! has searched ~or a general standard which might 
have some guidance to the parties in n99otiations. Mot inf'r'!quently. 
the welfar~ de~artnent is involved in the situation. A11 states, inc1ud~ 
ing Utah. that have adop~e<i the Uniform Child.Support Aet. have ccnmittees 
·,.,ftich attemQ't to establish a conscionaot e standard of what the non-~us't:Qdial 
par-...nt 'lfi 11 pay to a custx:ldia t pa~nt or a •,.;e1 far"'! agency. The Utah 
ccrmri t:ae has consul tad .,..; th the other states, and- the current Utah 
schedule is a.e--ached. The ·..elfare aqencies use a for.nu1a that involves 
some calculations, but the final ~suit is based on gross inc:=me, and is· 
,,fleet-ad in the attached table.. The ta.b1e assumes the non-~ustodia1 
parent has normal tastes, and ft makes normal a11owances for independent 
11vinq and transportation, taxes, etc. rn an effort to avoid unnecessary 
1itigat1on e.xpenses 1 a custodial par~nt ~i11 be permitt!d to secure an 
ex-parta order in acr:ordanca with the ta.ble. It 'MOuld, of ~urse, be 
ne<::essary that the custodial parent's affidavit contain evidence of ~rr!f:~ 
infonnation ~arding income of the non-custodial ~aren~. 
~hiTe the wetfa~ nearinq officer-1 are authorized to vary ZS~ in 
either d1r~t1on a~er hearing, no such variances a~ issued without hearings. 
rt is ~~e Coure 1 s nope that the adoption of suc:h a sche<iu1e will avoid 
some litigation and expense. !n adoptinq the Rule, the ~urt dc~s-~ot 
intend to limit_ either _party's right ta a. h.eal:i..o.g.. 1.h.ou.11 .e:t.t.nu sid.e. 
r!quest it. 
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RULE 
A custodial party may secure an ex-parte child support order in accord-
ance with the attached table. The request must contain an affidavit as to 
the non-custodi~1 parent 1 s gross income, based on reasonably certain 
. . 
information. Ex-parte orders without th.e affidavit will not be granted~· 
E.x-parte orders for child support amounts above the figures in the table 
will not be grantea, nor will figures below the table be accepted, without 
hearing. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-7-
ARGUMENT 
POINI' 1. RESPONDENT, HAVING ENGAGED IN FRAUD AND DECEIT AND 
THEREBY HAvmG FAILED TO ro EQUITY, WAS NOr ENTITLED TO A wwm OF 
EQUITABLE RELIEF. 
It is well settled that divorce actions an:l supplenental 
actions therein for rrodifications of support orders are equitable in 
nature. U.C.A., 1953, 30-3-5. Further, Article VIII, Section 9 of the 
Utah Constitution penni.ts the Supreme Court to review questions of both 
law and fact in equity cases, and, thus to make its own fin:li.ngs and 
substitute its own judg:m3nt for that of the trial court when it is fair 
and equitable in the interest of justice. Wright vs. Wright 586 P.2d 
443, 445 (Utah 1978). 
It is furrlamental that it is incumbent upon one seeking equity 
to do equity with respect to the subject matter involved, before relief 
will be awarded. 27 Arn. Jur. 2d Equity § 131, Page 660: Coleman 
Company, Inc. vs. Southwest Field Irrigation Canpany 584 P.2d 883, 884 
(Utah 1978). In Coleman supra., the plaintiff sought equitable relief 
in the fonn of a prescriptive easement, after having changed the location 
of a ditch, \-A'lich was involved in the need for the said easement, for 
its own benefit and convenience. In so doing, it had effectively 
increased the burden ui::on the defendant, from whom the relief was sought, 
so the court refused to grant equitable relief. 
In Jacobson vs. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156 (Utah 1976), a case 
involvi03 the suit of a son against a father to reform a deed, in 
equity, VJhere the plaintiff had previously deceived a court and creditors 
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with respect to his claimed interest in the property, the Utah court 
noted: 
* * * The precept that equity does not reward one 
who has engaged in fraud or deceit in the business 
under consideration, but reserves its rewards for 
those who are themselves acting in fairness and 
go<Xi conscience, or as is sometimes said, to those 
who have cane into court with clean hands. 
In the case at han::l, it was made clear and the trial court 
found that the resp:>n::lent had concealed her rerrarriage from the appellant 
and accepted alimony payments fran him for a peric:rl of thirty-five 
(35) rronths. Further, it cannot be doubted that she knew that she was 
not entitled to receive the said al.L'llOny, which conclusion can be 
drawn by inference fran her S'WOrn statement that she thought of the 
money as "additional" rroney. (P.2 of her Affidavit in support of her 
Order to Show Cause. ) 
Thus, respondent had failed to do equity by kroNingly accepting 
alirrony payments which were no longer due, and, through her deceit and 
fraudulent behavior, increased the b..lrden upon the appellant for support 
payments. After thirty-five months of receiving an extra $50.00 per 
month, the respondent was caught. Faced with receivirg only $100.00 
per rronth, sre sought to be rewarded by the court in equity in a fashion 
which would nake up for the rroney no longer being received. As a result 
of her previoos cheating on supp:>rt payments, the court belON should 
have refused, as it did in Tuttle vs. Henderson, 628 P.2d 1275 (Utah 1981), 
to consider equitable relief. In the Tuttle case, Id., an action by a 
mother seeking a change in custody after "snatching" the child from 
the father, the court stated, at 1277, that 
* * * In any equitable proceeding, the fun::lamental 
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rule is that he who seeks equity must do equity. 
Plaintiff has not done equity in the instant case. 
Am, therefore, respond.ent herein has not done equity. The 
court belo.v erred in granting an increase in child support. 
POINT 2. UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED, THE COURI' BELOW 
SUBS~~IALLY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCREI'ION IN FINDING A CHANGE IN 
CIRCUMSTANCE SUFFICIENT TO INCREASE CHILD SUPPORT AND, FURrHER, IN 
ITTILIZING A PREDETERML.'IBD SCHEDULE AND CJNSEOUENrLY ORDERING AN L.~CREASE 
IN CHILD SUPPORT TO $225.00 PER M:>NI'H. 
As was noted at the beginning of Point 1, this is an equitable 
action, and the court is authorized to make its own find.ings an:l sub-
stitute its own judgrrent for that of the court bela.v in the interest of 
justice. See also Dahlberg vs. Dahlberg, 77 u. 157, 292 P. 214, 217 
(Utah 1930). 
The Utah court has consistently noted that it may disturb the 
result of such an action where the result is unjust or inequitable, 
where the evidence preponderates against the findings, or where there 
was a misapplication of the law or the facts resulting in such an error 
or abuse of discretion. Dahlberg vs. Dahlberg, Id. , at 216, WestenskCM 
vs. Westenskc::M 562 P. 2d 1256, 1258 (Utah 1977) , McBrocrn vs. McBroan 
14 Utah 2d 393, 384 P.2d 961, (1963). In McBroan, Id., at 962 it was 
noted that the court "* * *will not disturb a trial court's judgment 
in the division of property or awards of al:L.-noI1¥ and child support 
unless it app:!ars to be unjust, inequitable, or contrary to the evidence 
and. therefore an abuse of discretion. Whether the awards are unjust 
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or inequitable must necessarily depend up:m the facts ani circumstances 
in each particular case." (Citation emitted) 
It has, further, been stated consistently that there is no 
general rule which may be followed by th~ trial court, but that the 
conclusion with respect to support payrrents must be "based upon "* * * 
the peculiar circumstances of each case." Bullen vs. Bullen, 71 U.63 262 
P.292, 293 (utah 1927). See also Wooley vs. Wooley 113 Utah 391, 
195 P.2d 743, 745, (1948) wherein the court noted that generally accepted 
guidelines are only guidelines and that the evidence in each case must 
be applied. There, the application of the guidelines resulted in an 
unjust order with respect to the assets. 
This court has set forth and ref erred to certain evidentiary 
elements whiCh should be given consideration in detennining al.i.rrony, 
supp:>rt payments arrl property settlements. See Pinion vs. Pinion, 
92 Utah 255 67 P.2d 265, 267, (1937); Allen vs. Allen, 109 u. 99, 
165 P.2d 872, 875 (1946). 
In owen vs. OWen, 579 P.2d 911, 913, (Utah 1978), the court 
addressed the issues applicable to an increase in child support thusly: 
While an increase of the deferrlant's incare is 
certainly an important factor to consider, this 
proposition is also true: the fact that a man rray 
so use his abilities as to increase his incane 
should not necessarily impose a penalty up:m him 
by autcmatically increasing his obligations urrler 
a divorce decree. The increase in incane is only 
to be considered along with the other facts and 
circumstances concerning t.he needs of the children 
and the ability of the father and rrother to provide 
for them. There is yet another ma.tter which, though 
not of controlling importance, the trial court could 
legitimately give sane attention to in judging the 
e:iuities as between these parties and the welfare 
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of their children. That is that this defendant 
appears to have willingly and regularly made the 
payrrents required by the decree, which is al 1 too 
frequently not the case. 
In the instant case, each of these factors applies. The 
court belaw found that the appellant' s inca-oo had increased, due to 
inflation. At the same time, })is ex-wife's income had increased 
dramatically and the court even predicted that her income would :improve 
rapidly over the next five years. (See T-121) Some other relevant 
facts and circumstances, which should have been given consideration 
by the court, involve the relative expenses of the parties. 'While 
appellant's necessary living ex:penses, without any rroney for frills 
such as clothing, vacation, entertainment or gifts, left him with 
approximately $30.00 per rronth for such extras (T-95-97); his ex-
wife's situation was such that she had $400.00 left over after paying 
for what she justified as her necessary expenses. (T-55-56) (This fact 
may be detennined by adding the then existing child supp::>rt ($150.00) 
per rronth to her net rronthly incane, ($1,223.00), for $1,373.00 total, 
and subtracting therefrom the $970.00 "necessary" expenses which she 
incurred each rronth. Included within those expenses were the expenses 
necessary for supporting the child. It is, therefore, easy to understand 
why she did not bring an action to increase child suppjrt until she 
was caught improperly accepting alimony payments.) 
Had the court belc:M applied these facts, it could only have 
fairly and equitably detennined that there was not a substantial change 
in circumstance which warranted an increase in child suppjrt payments. 
Despite inflation, the $150.00 per rronth adequately assisted the 
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res.EXJndent in supJ;XJrting the parties' child. If anything, the support 
amount may have been set too high at the beginning. Had the respondent 
not so successfully increased her ability to provide supp:>rt, a change 
in circumstance such as that referred to in Wright vs. Wright, supra, 
at 445, might have teen found. (There, inflationary wage increases had 
kept the father in the same relative financial condition, while hurting 
that of rcot.her and child.) 
Even if inflation had caused a sufficient change in this case, 
the court below should have rrore properly considered the ability of 
the appellant to pay. As was noted in the Wright case, supra, at page 446, 
there rrust be a finding with respect to the ability of the noncustodial 
parent to pay~ even if there is a requisite need. In light of the 
uncontradicted :t;acts before the court with respect to the abilities of 
the appellant in the instant case, it v-ould only be appropriate to 
conclude that he had no ability to support an increase: especially not 
a $75.00 per month increase. Accordingly, the result of the order is 
not only contrary to the evidence, but is unjust and inequitable. 
A review of the facts adduced before the court, and application 
of the said facts tothe various factors to be considered does not, in 
any way, lend itself to a logical basis for the award of t11e court of 
an increase to $225.00 per rronth child supp:>rt. However, reference to 
the court's ONn predetennined schedule does lend itself to such a 
calculation, through matherratics. If one takes the gross nonthly incane 
of the appellant, approximately $2,148.00 (Exhibit 7P), and strictly 
applies the schedule, the arrount to be paid would be $232.00. Then, 
allONing for the variance (within twenty-five (25%) percent according 
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to the p::>licy statement) upon a hearing, it can be seen that the award 
of an increase VJas easily within the range. 
According to t.li.e face of the schedule, it was promulgated 
pursuant to 45 CTR 302. 53. The section referred to calls for the 
provision of a fonnula (not a schedule) to be utilized "* * * pursuant 
to Section 302.50 [detennination of amounts to "be collected in enforcing 
child support Which had been :paid by the state] ~.ihen there is no court 
order covering the obligation." (Emphasis supplied) The section states 
that the formula should take into account certain factors including the 
incane and resources of the absent parent, the earning potential of the 
absent parent, the reasonable necessities of the absent parent, the 
ability of the absent parent to borro.v, and the needs of the child for 
whan support is sought, inter alia. Conspicuously absent fran such 
criteria are similar provisions with respect to the ability of the 
custodial parent to pay. This absence would seem logical, as the 
custcxiial parent v.ould not be likely to have a great ability to support 
the child if she were seeking the support of the government to so do. 
There is no evidence with respect to how the said criteria 
were dealt with. Rather, the schedule's explanation states that "[i]t 
autorratically assumes deductions and necessities, nonnal taxes, trans-
portation, e:nployment and living expenses, etc." It further states 
that it is for use in detennining the total ex parte temporary 
supfX)rt order. It is also intended to give parties a negotiating 
"target". 
T'ne explanation expressly provides that "(t]he noncustodial 
party will be granted a hearing for a change fran this schedule, if 
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such a hearing is requested." Further, in its adoption of the rule 
utilizing the table, the District Court referred only to use in the 
context of an ex pa.rte order, and in its policy statement stated that 
In adopting the rule, the court does not intend to 
limit either party's right to a hearing, should 
either side request it. 
It is clearly arbitrary and, therefore, a clear abuse of 
discretion, to utilize such a fonnula or schedule to detennine the arrount 
of child support Which must be paid. See, for example, Barlow vs. Barlow, 
282 s.w. 2d 429 (Texas 1955), wherein the court used"*** an established 
fonnula, well known all over the district, * * *11 (Id: at 431.) The 
Texas court concluded that such a detennination was arbitrary, clearly 
erroneous, and stated: 
The facts of this case, as in every case 
involving child support, require the exercise 
of a sound discretion by the trial judge, and 
not the arbitrary application of any fonnula. 
Another Texas court also had occasion, in Walton vs. Walton, 
567 s.w. 2d 66 (Texas 1978), to consider the use of a schedule. In 
Walton, the trial court used a ~chedule supplied by the state bar in setting 
child support. There, the court did not find an abuse of discretion, 
and distinguished the situation fran that in BarlON, noting that the 
court belc:M it had utilized the schedule only to assist it in multiplying 
the figures with respect to salaries, and the judge had ccmnented, on 
the record, that he disagreed with the schedule and that his conclusion 
\vas not within the suggested guidelines. Id. 68-9 The Texas appellate 
court found it not to be an abuse of discretion to make such a use of 
a schedule. 
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Appellate courts in Nebraska and Oregon, although not presented 
with facts involving an arbitra:r:y use of a schedule such as that in 
the instant case, have also had occasion to note that the determination 
of the arrount of support vmich should be paid is not susceptible to 
the awlication of a mathematical f onnula based upon the incare of the 
noncustodial f0,rty. See Peery vs. Peery, 191 Neb. 782, 217 N.W.2d 
837, 839 (Nebraska 197 4) ; Picker vs. Vollenhover, 290 P. 2d 789, 800 
(Oregon 1955). 
It is reasonably certain that, to make the detennination that 
he did, the judge below could only have used the schedule which he 
prepared to determine the child support amount. Even respondent• s 
cotmsel did not attempt an argument on the facts and circumstances in 
advancing resp:mdent' s request for an increase. Rather, he concluded 
his argument with respect to child supp:>rt by stating: 
Th.is schedule was prepared b'j your honor. Your 
honor has followed it, and I would think, your 
honor, that the schedule ought to be for the 
benefit of this particular child because this 
child needs it and needs the benefit of both 
parents in order to rraintain the benefits that 
the child should have. Thank you. 
Api;:arently the trial judge, after having pre:pared the schedule, 
came to believe it bad some inherent value. 
To use the schedule 'Was arbitrary and an abuse of discretion. 
It, further, led to an unfair and inequitable result. 
POINT 3. APP~ WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUI'IONAL RIGHT TO 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY THE TRIAL COURT'S USE OF A PREDETEBMINED SCHEDULE, 
INSTEAD OF THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BEFORE IT, TO ESTABLISH CHILD SUPPORr. 
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The Fifth and Fourteenth amendments to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, § 7 of the Utah State Constitution guarantee 
all persons that they shall not be deprive:l of their property without 
due process of law. 
Wi t.l-i respect to the said protection under the Federal 
Constitution, the United States Supreme Court, in State of Washington 
ex rel. Oregon Railroad & Navigation Ccmpany vs. Fairchild, 224 U.S. 
510, 524-25, 56 L.Ed. 863, 868, (1912) observed that a party 
* * *must have the right to secure and present 
evidence ma.terial to the issue under investiga-
tion. It nust be given the opportunity by proof 
and argtnnent to controvert the claim asserte:i 
against it before a tribunal round not only to 
listen, but to give legal effect to what has 
been established. (Emphasis supplied) 
The court also stated: 
For the guarantee of the constitution extends 
to the protection of fundamental rights, -
to the substance of the order as well as 
to the notice and hearing which precede it. 
"The :rrere fonn of the proceeding instituted 
against the owner, even if he be admitted to 
defend, cannot convert the process used in 
the due process of law, if the necessary 
result be to deprive him of his property 
without canpensation. 11 (Citation anitted) 
See also Ivins vs. Hardy, 333 P.2d 471, Petition for Re-
hearing 334 P.2d 721, 722 (~ntana 1959), wherein the court applied the 
principal to an arbitrary formula for setting a fee for a grazing pennit. 
Similarly, in Christiansen vs. Harris, 109 U 1, 163 P. 2d 314, 
317 (Utah 1945), the court has observed that under the Utah Constitution 
due process protection extends to the right to have judgment rendered based 
on the record which was made through the procedural protections. Although, 
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in the context of the opinion, the "essentials of due process" Which 
are cited are limited to the deprivation of a person of his life or 
liberty, it is submitted that the Utah principle applies equally to 
the deprivation of property. 
As has been established in Point 2 of this brief on appeal, 
the only basis for the court's child support award of $225.00 is the 
use of the predetennined schedule which had been adopted by the court 
bela.N' for use in ex pa.rte, preliminary orders. 
As has also been shONn in Point 2, the only fair and equitable 
conclusion which could have been reached through a proper application 
of the facts before the court is that no substantial change in 
circumstance warranting an increase in child support _p3.yments was shown 
and, further, that even if it had been defendant does not have the ability 
to meet such an increase as that established by the court through the 
use of the schedule. Therefore, although the court does not specifically 
refer to it when making his order, it is clear fran these facts and 
from the urgings of respondent's camsel in argument that the said 
schedule was used. 
To so determine the amount of rroney which appellant, by the 
court's order will be deprived of, is to render meaningless and empty 
the other procedurai protections, including the opportunity to present 
evidence to the court. To place an arbitrary schedule above the uncon-
tradicted evidence before the court turns appellant's right to a day 
in court into a practical waste of time for all parties involved. 
Appellant's right to due process was simply denied by the 
said use of the schedule. 
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Q)NCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant therefore suhnits that 
the court below substantially erred in granting to resp:mient a reward 
of an increase in child support to $225.00 per rronth, arrl that the 
decision of the lower court should be reversed. No increase in child 
support should have been awarded. 
Resp:mdent did not deserve to be rewarded by the court in 
equity. The evidence clearly indicated arxl the court fourrl that respon::lent 
bad concealed her remarriage frcm the appellant. The concealment was 
successful for a period of thirty-five rronths, during which she improperly 
accepted alirrony payments from the appellant. On the face of her 
Affidavit filed with the Order to Show cause, it could be seen that 
she was aware of what she was doing, but had rationalized it. Courts, 
including this court, have often said that equity will not reward 
those who do rot cane to coort with clean hands in the business under 
consideration. Resporrlent fraudulently obtained extra support from 
the appellant for nearly three years. After she was caught, she refused 
to agree to make up the debt. Rather, she brought this act.ion for an 
increase in child supi;:ort. According to the law of equity, the court 
should have refused to grant her relief, because of her unclean hands. 
Even if the case could have been considered in equity, the 
court below abused its discretion by not properly considering the 
facts presented to it, and by arbitrarily applying a schedule drawn 
for another purpose to detennine what arrount the child support should 
be. As appellant has stibni tted by thorough application of the facts 
in his second p:>int, the evidence preporrlerates against the firx1ing 
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that a substantial chan:;e in circumstance had ta."l(en place warranting 
an increase in child support. A revie.N of the relative financial 
situations of the parties indicates that the then existing child supp::>rt 
amount, $150.00 per rronth, was sufficient to assist the respondent in 
supporting the child. With that rroney, the respondent had an extra 
$400.00 per nonth for non-necessary expenditures. This \Vas largely 
the result of the dram:ttic increase in her standard of livin:_j since 
the divorce. 
Mea.n.-ihile, the appellant's position had only improved as a 
result of inflation. After rcakirg the $150. 00 payment, the uncontradicted 
evidence indicated that he VJOuld have approximately $30.00 left for non-
necessary eXJ;enditures, such as for clothing, gifts, entertainment and 
the like. Therefore, not only was the need satisfied by the previous 
arrount, but it was also clear tbat the appellant simply could not 
afford to pay any more. 
Even so, the court belON abused its discretion and found a change 
in circumstarx:e. It awarded an increase to $225.00 per m:mth, which is 
highly unjust and inequitable under all of the facts. Based upon the 
eviden:::e, alone, the decision should be reversed. 
However, the trial court' s abuse of discretion became more 
distinct as a result of arbitrariness. Respondent's counsel argued 
only that a predetermined schedule should be used to set child support. 
The schedule, on its face, was intended only for use in absence of an 
evidentiary hearing. Further, t.Yie rule had been drafted for situations 
involvi~ indigent custo:iial parents, and therefore made certain, un-
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defined, assumptions based thereon7 arrl looked only to the gross incane 
of the noncustodial parent. To have made use of such a schedule in 
substitution for the facts was arbitrary. The trial court could oot have 
arrived at the a.'llount awarded through application of the facts presented, 
except through application of appellant's gross incare to the schedule. 
'As a result, the trial coort's decision was arbitrary, as well as 
unfair and unjust, and clearly an abuse of discretion which should be 
set aside. 
In ad.di tion to the abuse of discretion which resulted fran 
the arbitrary use of the predetennined schedule, appellant suffered the 
further consequence of being denied his right to due process of law. It 
is basic to our very syste.n of justice that certain rights, arrounting 
to a day in coort, must be honored by the courts. 'Ihe culmination of 
these procedural rights Im.lst be that, based upon the evidence properly 
before it, the court 1W0Uld make its decision. In this case, even 
though the parties were given an opp::>rtunity to present their evidence 
and cross examine each others' witnesses to establish the relative 
needs arrl abilities Which make up the situation of the parties, the 
trial court took it upon himself to use a predetennined schedule to 
detennine child support payments and, unjustly arrl through a deprivation 
of due process, ignored the evidence. Appellant was thereby denied 
the very essence of his right to a day in court. 
The decision of the trial judge should be reversed for any 
arrl all of the reasons stated above, and the child support payment 
should rema.in at $150. 00 per rronth. That failing, appellant should be 
granted a new hearing with directions that the court make its decision 
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independent of arr:1 predetennined schedule. 
Respectfully sul:mitted this 26th day of April, 1982. 
MAILING CERI'IFICI'E 
I hereby certify that on the 26th day of April, 1982, I mailed 
two copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to Pete N. Vlahos, 2447 Kiesel 
Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401. 
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